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Abstract:
The purpose of this paper is to analyse how market power may aﬀect the
allocation of production between seasons (summer and winter) in a hydro
power system with reservoirs and where inflow in winter is uncertain. We
find that even without market power we expect lower average prices during
summer than during winter. Furthermore, we find that market power may in
some situations lead to more sales during summer and in other situations to
less sales during summer. Thus market power is found to have an ambiguous
eﬀect on the supply shortage in years with low inflow.
1We are indebted to seminar participants at Department of Economics, Norwegian
School of Economics and Business Administration, for helpful comments on an earlier
draft.
2Corresponding author. Address: Norwegian School of Economics and Business Ad-
ministration, Department of Economics, 5045 Bergen, Norway.
1 Introduction
In some countries the electricity production is dominated by hydro power.3
The hydro power production system is often quite complex, especially in
those cases where water can be stored in reservoirs. In particular, there is
uncertainty concerning the inflow of water. Storage in one period may lead
to spill of water if there is a large inflow in the next period. In such cases,
how do we expect producers with market power to behave? For example,
one may ask whether exertion of market power may lead to a more severe
shortage. Could it be that they produce early on, to have less water available
later on?4 If so, exertion of market power is expected to worsen situations
with supply shortage in dry years and may lead to dramatic price hikes.
With a few notable exceptions, there are no studies raising this question.5
The purpose of this paper is to analyse whether market power can lead to a
more severe shortage in periods with a limited supply (dry year) compared
to a situation with perfect competition.
Our study is motivated by the observations in the Nordic power market
2002-03. The spot price in January 2003 was more than 80 øre/kWh, while
the average price in a year with normal inflow is approximately 20 øre/kWh.
The producers claimed that the reason for the price hike was the low water
inflow to the reservoirs in autumn 2002. Data seems to support this claim,
saying that it was in fact an extraordinarily low rainfall in the late autumn
3In New Zealand 80% of production is from hydro, in Chile 70%, Brazil 97% and
Norway close to 100%.
4A similar type of question has been analysed by Stiglitz (1976) with regard to ex-
ploitation of exhaustible natural resources. Assuming positive extraction cost and rate of
interest and iso-elastic demand he finds that a monopolist is more conservation minded
than what is socially optimal.
5There are some studies of the allocation of water between diﬀerent time periods, see
Førsund (1994), Bushnell (2003), Scott and Read (1996), Crampes and Moreaux (2001)
and Skaar and Sørgard (2003). But none of these studies introduce uncertainty concerning
water inflow.
The issue of water allocation between periods when there is uncertainty about inflow
has been analysed by Mathiesen (1992). In this study however, producers are assumed to
behave as price-takers only.
In a more recent study Garcia et al (2001) analyse strategic behaviour in an infinite
horizon duopoly model where two hydro power producers can storage water and there
is uncertainty concerning water inflow. The question of market power and storage when
inflow is uncertain has also been analysed by Johnsen (2001). See below for more details
concerning these two studies.
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of 2002.6
But is this the whole picture? Could it be that strategic producer be-
haviour also contributed to the price hike?7 Victor D. Norman, the Minister
responsible for competition policy, said the following at the outset of the
period with supply shortage:
’A situation with low prices during summer and high prices during winter
may indicate that there has been an abuse of market power’. (Dagbladet
13.11.2002)
The argument is that a producer with market power could benefit from
producing a large amount during summer time, thereby limiting the supply in
winter. By doing so the producer could earn a large profit from high prices
during winter. In April 2003, when the supply shortage came to an end,
the Norwegian Competition Authority suggested that one should consider
to split the largest Norwegian hydro power producer, Statkraft, into several
independent firms. One argument for doing so was the following:8
’.., The Competition Authority will not rule out the possibility that lack of
competition may have increased the diﬃculties [supply shortage - our remark]
we have experienced ’.
We formulate a model where we are able to analyse how a producer with
market power would distribute his sales between summer and winter. During
autumn there will be either heavy rain or little rain. If there is heavy rain,
the inflow is so large that some water may be spilled (reservoirs are full).
Whether some water is spilled or not depends on the inflow and the size of
the reservoirs. If there is little rain during autumn, all inflow can be stored
in reservoirs and used for production in the winter season.
First, we show that even under perfect competition the average price
during summer is lower than average price during winter. The reason is that
a high inflow can lead to waste of water (reservoirs are full), and then it would
have been better to sell a little more during summer at a low price than to
wait and risk a spill of water if there is a large inflow. The implication is that
one cannot conclude whether there has been an abuse of market power or not
by just observing price diﬀerences between summer and winter. In contrast,
when there is a zero probability of spill of water we find that absence of
6See, for example, Bye et al. (2003).
7We became recently aware that Førsund et al. (2003) has raised the same questions
as we do, in a report for the Ministry of Oil and Energy.
8From a letter the Norwegian Competition Authority sent to the Ministry of Trade and
Industry, the owner of Statkraft.
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market power will lead to identical prices in summer and winter. In such a
case a price diﬀerence between summer and winter would indicate exertion
of market power.
Second, we find that exertion of market power has an ambiguous eﬀect on
the distribution of sales between summer and winter (storage). On the one
hand, a producer with market power may sell a large quantity during summer
in order to constrain his supply and obtain a high price during winter. Or
he may choose to do the opposite, selling a low quantity during summer to
achieve a higher summer price. In this latter case market power may lead to
a more limited diﬀerence between prices summer and winter.
Our result contrasts with Garcia et al. (2001), who found that market
power always leads to higher prices during summer. The driving force behind
their result is the modeling of the demand side. They apply a rectangular
demand function, where the price during winter time is exogenously given.
Then a shift of production from summer to winter will have no eﬀect the
winter price. In contrast, in our model there is a trade oﬀ. A shift of
production from summer to winter would lead to higher prices during summer
and lower prices during winter. This explains why we found that market
power in some instances can lead to a shift in production from summer to
winter, and in other instances to a reallocation of production from winter to
summer.
Johnsen (2001) analyses market power and storage in a situation with
limited transmission capacity between two regions connected by a single ra-
dial transmission line. He applies a simple two-period model similar to the
one used in our paper. A numerical example is provided to illustrate that a
monopolist finds it profitable to increase production in the first period when
inflow is certain. The monopolist does this to avoid the possibility of be-
coming export constrained in the second period if high inflow occurs. Thus,
storage is concluded to be lower in the monopoly case than in the competitive
case.
We abstract from the possibility of transmission constraints as we look
only at allocation of water between periods within a single geographic area.
Also, diﬀerent from Johnsen (2001), we analyse situations where the size of
the water reservoir may constrain production and situations where the energy
constraint may not be binding. As mentioned above, we find that market
power has an ambiguous eﬀect on storage. This is in contrast to Johnsen
(2001) who finds that storage is lower in the monopoly case.
This article is organised as follows. In the next section we present the
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model, and in Section 3 we analyse the equilibrium outcomes in four diﬀerent
regimes. In Section 4 we apply a linear demand function, while in Section 4
we provide some concluding remarks. Proofs are presented in Appendices A
and B.
2 The model
We consider an industry where electricity is generated from water, and we
will use the Norwegian market as an illustration.
With reference to the graphs in figure 1 a hydrological year may be de-
scribed in terms of four periods (of somewhat unequal length). Starting in
spring, (between week 16 and 21) there is a large inflow of water from snow
melting. In summer there is little rain and typically consumption exceeds ad-
ditional inflow in this period. The autumn is normally a rainy season where
inflow again exceeds consumption, while in winter the precipitation comes
mainly in the form of snow that is unavailable for electricity production until
spring.9 This seasonal pattern repeats. Inflow varies considerably over the
year, while consumption changes less. Also, inflow in any period is highly
uncertain, while consumption is considerably less uncertain. Thus we will
treat inflow as uncertain and consumption as deterministic.
Although the graphs indicate four distinct periods, the analysis is con-
ducted within a two-period model, interpreted as summer and winter. Our
concern is the allocation of water between these two periods. In particu-
lar, how much water will be used for electricity production in summer and
thereby, how much water will be stored for later use? This allocation is stud-
ied for two diﬀerent modes of producer behaviour: A price taker and a price
setter. Our interest lies with finding out who will use most water during
summer and thus have less available for the winter season.
The model is illustrated in Figure 2. To simplify the analysis we disregard
the multi-year dimension, i.e., the possibility to even out extreme inflows over
several years. In our analysis, the hydrological year starts with the inventory
U1.10 At the decision point in summer this inventory is known, while the
autumn inflow U2 is uncertain. Our analysis is one of decision making under
92002 was a dry year with little inflow during the autumn. This is illustrated in Figure
1, where the reservoir level during the autumn 2001 is considerably higher compared to
the autumn 2002.
10U1 may alternatively be thought of as an inflow of water at the beginning of period 1.
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Figure 2: Illustration of the model.
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uncertainty with respect to the autumn inflow. This inflow is thought of as
materializing at the beginning of period 2. We assume that the inflow will
be high (UH2 ) or low (U
L
2 ) with probabilities q and (1− q) respectively, and
that UH2 > U
L
2 . Furthermore, we will assume that U
L
2 is so low that reservoir
capacity (R) always is suﬃcient, while UH2 is so high compared to R, that
some water may be spilled.
We want to compare the outcome of a competitive equilibrium with that
of an industry of producers with market power. To represent the latter we
consider the collusive outcome. In the subsequent presentation and discussion
of the model we simplify by talking about one producer that may behave as a
price taker or as a monopolist when making his decisions, i.e., production (in
the two periods): x1 respectively xi2, i = H,L. Furthermore, let w
i denote
spill of water in state i, i = H,L.
Both kinds of producers seek to maximize profits, the diﬀerence between
them being how they regard the market prices. A monopolist assumes he
can set prices, while a price taker by definition assumes that prices are given
beyond his control. Let pt(.) and Dt(.), t = 1, 2 denote inverse and direct
demand respectively.
The objective for the monopolist can be formulated as11
Max
x1,xL2 ,x
H
2
p1(x1)x1 + qp2(x
H
2 )x
H
2 + (1− q)p2(xL2 )xL2 .
The maximization of the sum of producers and consumers surpluses would
generate the competitive equilibrium
Max
x1,xL2 ,x
H
2
ϕ1(x1)x1 + qϕ2(x
H
2 )x
H
2 + (1− q)ϕ2(xL2 )xL2 , where ϕ =
Z x
0
p(s)ds.
There are several constraints on decision variables x1, xH2 and x
L
2 , some
of which are obvious, like production has to be non-negative. In addition, we
have the following restrictions:
(i) Period 1 production:
x1 ≤ min{U1,D1(0)}.
11Except for water values, variable production costs of electricity from hydro are small.
In line with this, other variable costs than water values are by assumption set to zero in
our analysis.
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Production has to stay within the given amount of water (U1), and the pro-
ducer will never supply more than demand at a price of zero.
(ii) Available energy after autumn inflow:
Zi ≡ U1 − x1 + U i2 − wi ≤ R, i = H,L.
What is not consumed for production in period 1 (U1 − x1) will be stored.
With the addition of autumn inflow (U i2), stored water has to be within the
reservoir capacity (R). This restriction may imply that some water (wi) has
to be spilled. Thus Zi denotes the available energy for production in period
2.
(iii) Period 2 production:
xi2 ≤ min{Zi,D2(0)}, i = H,L.
Production has to stay within the given amount of energy (Zi).12 Further-
more, the producer will never produce beyond demand at a price of zero.13
3 Equilibrium outcomes
Our concern is as mentioned above: Will a firm with market power store more
or less water from summer to winter than a firm without market power? In
order to highlight this issue, we make a few assumptions that further delineate
the analysis.
For given demand, represented by D1(p1) and D2(pi2) (or equivalently the
willingness to pay p1(x1) and p2(xi2)), the model has four parameters R, U1
and U i2, i = H,L. We now rule out parameter combinations that are of little
relevance to our issue.
Assumption 1:
x1 < U1.
The initial inventory of water is suﬃcient for optimal production in any mode
of producer behaviour in period 1. We are concerned with the consequences
of shortage or surplus of energy in winter, not a shortage in summer.
12If demand, D2(0), is lower than available energy, the surplus is spilled. This spill
comes in addition to the spill of water caused by limited reservoir capacity, wi.
13We assume that demand during period 2 is independent of the state of world with
respect to inflow at the beginning of the period.
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Assumption 2:
U1 − x1 + UL2 < R.
Inflow in a dry autumn (UL2 ) is so small that the reservoir never becomes
binding. Hence, wL = 0. Assumption 2 also applies to any mode of behav-
iour. It is the high inflow state that may cause spill of water.
Assumption 3:
xi2 = Zi whenever p2(Zi) > 0, i = H,L.
Assumption 3 relates to period 2 production in both states. With regard to
state L, we qualify Assumption 3 further by considering only combinations
of inflow and reservoir capacity resulting in a positive price and marginal
revenue in period 1 and positive expected price and marginal revenue in
state L. The implications are that all the available energy is used both in
the competitive and collusive equilibrium if there is low inflow and that the
realised price in this state is positive by definition.
In state H on the other hand, there may be so much water available that
the monopoly producer would like to produce less than what is available in
order to ensure a positive marginal revenue from sales in state H. We make
the assumption that authorities can enforce production as long as there is
demand at a positive price. In particular, we assume that the authorities
can detect and prevent water from being spilled (in excess of wH) as long as
there is positive demand. This assumption applies to the monopolist, who in
some situations in state H would otherwise spill water in order to increase
the price.14 We relax this assumption in Section 4.3 below.
Through assumptions 1 − 3 the producers’ maximization problem is re-
duced to a question of finding production levels in period 1 and in the high
inflow state of the world in period 2.
Max
x1,xH2
{p1(x1)x1 + qpH2 (xH2 )xH2 + (1− q)pL2 (UL2 + U1 − x1)[UL2 + U1 − x1]}.
Subject to
14The assumption that there is no spill of water is common in the literature, see for
example Johnsen et al (1999) and Crampes and Moreaux (2001). Morover, The Norwe-
gian Competition Authority also made such an assumption in an acquisition case in the
Norwegian power market in 2001-02 (Statkraft acquiring Agder Energi).
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xH2 = min{ZH , D2(0)}.
Next, we characterise diﬀerent equilibrium outcomes (regimes) depending
on the parameter values.
3.1 The four regimes
For a given demand, available energy and the reservoir capacity may con-
strain the solution. The various combinations of these parameters are illus-
trated in Table 1.
Reservoir capacity, R
R = xH2 R > x
H
2
U1 + U
H
2 R4: R constrains; R3: Energy constrains;
= x1 + x
H
2 energy constrains; p2(x
H
2 ) > 0.
Energy, p2(xH2 ) > 0.
U1 + U
H
2 R2: R constrains; R1: D2(0) constrains;
U1 + U
H
2 p2(x
H
2 ) > 0; p2(x
H
2 ) = 0.
> x1 + x
H
2 w
H > 0. wH = 0.
Table 1: The four regimes
Regime 1.
The inflow in state H is high. In this regime, reservoir capacity is also
large and further production in period 2 is constrained by demand. Hence,
we have that p2(xH2 ) = 0 and any additional water is spilled. In the low inflow
state, and by assumption 3, the energy constraint is binding and p2(xL2 ) > 0.
When considering the optimal allocation of water between periods, a price
taking firm, at the margin, either sells one unit in period 1 at the price p1
or stores it; with probability (1 − q) the unit sells at price p2(xL2 ) or with
probability q it sells at a price equal to zero. In a competitive equilibrium
the price in period 1 equals the expected price of period 2,
p1 = (1− q)p2(xL2 ) + qp2(xH2 ) = (1− q)p2(xL2 ). (1)
The monopoly firm considers its marginal revenue rather than the price
it obtains when allocating water between periods. Thus the equilibrium in
this regime has to satisfy
9
p1[1−
1
|e1| ] = (1− q)p2(x
L
2 )[1−
1
|e2| ] + qp2(x
H
2 )[1−
1
|e2| ]
= (1− q)p2(xL2 )[1−
1
|e2| ], (2)
where e1 and e2 denote price elasticities of demand in period 1 and 2 respec-
tively.
Regime 2.
In this regime, the reservoir capacity constrains the amount of available
energy in state H. The producer is unable to satisfy all demand in period 2,
also in a wet year. This implies that p2(xH2 ) > 0. In summer the producer
knows that a high inflow in autumn will lead to spill of water, which means
that the marginal unit stored in summer does not make it to the winter.15
If there is low inflow, however, the marginal unit stored will be used
for production in winter. The equilibrium condition in a situation with no
market power is as follows:
p1 = (1− q)p2(xL2 ). (3)
In the monopoly equilibrium the equivalent condition is
p1[1−
1
|e1| ] = (1− q)p2(x
L
2 )[1−
1
|e2| ]. (4)
Regime 3.
In this regime, inflow in stateH is low compared to reservoir capacity and
demand, whereby p2(xH2 ) > 0. Furthermore, because the reservoir capacity is
non-binding, there is no spill of water and the marginal unit stored in period
1 has a positive value in state H.
Because of the non-binding reservoir, water is optimally allocated between
periods. Thus in a competitive equilibrium the price of period 1 has to equal
the expected price of period 2
p1 = (1− q)p2(xL2 ) + qp2(xH2 ). (5)
Similarly, the equilibrium condition for the monopoly has to satisfy
15We might say that p2(xH2 ) is irrelevant because the marginal unit stored in summer
never survives to period 2 state H.
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p1[1−
1
|e1| ] = (1− q)p2(x
L
2 )[1−
1
|e2| ] + qp2(x
H
2 )[1−
1
|e2| ]. (6)
Regime 4.
In this regime, both energy and reservoir constrain production. By defi-
nition, the limited energy implies that prices are positive in both states as in
regime 3. The reservoir constraint further implies that the producer cannot
freely allocate the scarce energy resource between periods, as in regime 3,
whereby production in period 1 will be higher than optimal, and the price in
period 1 will be lower than the expected price of period 2.16
The competitive equilibrium of this regime is therefore characterized by
p1 < (1− q)p2(xL2 ) + qp2(xH2 ) (7)
Similarly, in the monopoly equilibrium, the marginal revenue of period 1
is lower than the expected marginal revenue of period 2
p1[1−
1
|e1| ] < (1− q)p2(x
L
2 )[1−
1
|e2| ] + qp2(x
H
2 )[1−
1
|e2| ]. (8)
With reference to the four regimes described above and by focusing on
the competitive case, we can state the following proposition with respect to
the expected price diﬀerence between period 1 and period 2:
Proposition 1 Assume that 0 < q < 1. If the reservoir constraint is bind-
ing in equilibrium, then the price in period 1 is lower than the expected price
in period 2.
Proof. When the reservoir constraint is binding in the high inflow state
we have that xH2 = R. The reservoir constraint is binding in regimes 2 and
4 and the competitive equilibrium in both these regimes is characterized by
p1(x1) < (1− q)p2(xL2 ) + qp2(xH2 ).
Proposition 1 tells us that even under perfect competition the price in
period 1 may be lower than the expected price in period 2. Such price
diﬀerences may very well be the result of an eﬃcient allocation of resources
between periods. The intuition here is that if we do not use the water to
16Assumption 1 and the infeasibility of moving water (storage) forward in time (from
period 2 to period 1), rule out the possibility of having p1 > (1− q)p2(xL2 ) + qp2(xH2 ).
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produce electricity in period 1, there is a probability that water may be lost
due to the reservoir constraint. This result is important, because it means
that when the price in summer proves to be lower than the price in winter
year after year this is no proof of exertion of market power.
3.2 Equilibria in the same regime
Since we are unable to verify the existence of market power from observing
price diﬀerences between periods, we proceed by comparing price diﬀerences
between the competitive and the monopoly equilibrium. As an alternative
to focusing directly on the price diﬀerence we look at period 1 production.
If period 1 production is lower in one case than the other, this means that
storage is higher and also that the price in period 2 will be lower.
Above we have characterized four regimes and conditions on equilibrium
prices and marginal revenues with and without market power, respectively.
For a given parameter set (R,U1, U i2, i = H,L) there is no guarantee that
the competitive and monopoly equilibria fall into the same regime. In fact,
numerical examples show that the competitive regimes do not overlap com-
pletely with the corresponding monopoly regimes. Moreover, regime 1 im-
plies that marginal revenue will be negative. We deal with this more complex
situation below.
In this section, we compare production (and storage) of the competi-
tive and monopoly equilibria where by assumption both belong to the same
regime. In addition, we assume that marginal revenue corresponding to com-
petitive equilibrium production in state H is positive.17 One implication is
that regime 1 is ruled out of the analysis in this section.
Let bxv1 and exv1 represent equilibrium production in period 1 in regime v
(v = 1, 2, 3, 4) under competition and monopoly, respectively. The equilib-
rium production levels are derived from the equilibrium conditions stated
in equations (1) to (8). We consider the price elasticities in the compet-
itive equilibrium as the benchmark. Let |et| denote the absolute value of
the price elasticity in the competitive equilibrium. We then ask whether the
introduction of market power will lead to reallocation of production.
17The assumption that price and marginal revenue are positive holds for iso-elastic
demand where |et| > 1. However, since we we are interested in whether storage in the
monopoly case is higher or lower than in the competitive case we only need to assume that
marginal revenue is positive in state H at the level of competitive equilibrium output.
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Proposition 2 Assume that |et| > 1 and that reservoir capacity and in-
flow are such that the same regime applies to both the competitive and the
monopoly equilibrium. Then,
i) in regime 2, bx21 > ex21 if |e1| < |e2|.
ii) in regime 3, bx31 > ex31 if |e1| < |e2|.
ii) while bx41 = ex41 in regime 4.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Proposition 2 tells us that as long as the competitive and the monopoly
equilibrium are in the same regime, the price elasticity of demand is deci-
sive for whether market power leads to more or less production in period
1. If, for example, demand is less price elastic in period 1 than in period 2,
monopoly production in period 1 is lower than the competitive production.
The reason is that a firm with market power will exploit diﬀerences in market
characteristics. Note that the result in Proposition 2 does not depend on the
probability of high inflow.
3.3 Equilibria in diﬀerent regimes
As mentioned, the borderlines that define cut-oﬀ values between the four
regimes are not identical for the two equilibria. For certain values of reservoir
capacity and inflow (R,U1, U i2, i = H,L), the competitive equilibrium may
for instance be in regime 4, while the monopoly equilibrium belongs to regime
3. Then the simple criteria we reported in Proposition 2may no longer apply.
When we compare equilibria in diﬀerent regimes, we need to define the
cut-oﬀ values between the diﬀerent regimes in our two cases. Each regime is
defined for a certain range of inflow and reservoir values as illustrated in Ta-
ble 1. In order to be able to describe the cutoﬀ values between all 4 regimes,
we make use of period 1 equilibrium production determined by the first or-
der conditions applying to the diﬀerent regimes. After having defined each
regime under perfect competition and monopoly, we then compare period 1
production (and storage) in situations where the equilibria are in diﬀerent
regimes. Thus, we confine the discussion to the range of inflow and reservoir
values where the regime related to the competitive equilibrium is diﬀerent
from the regime associated with the monopoly equilibrium. We continue to
assume that marginal revenue is non-negative as described in the previous
section. The situations where regimes are identical are covered by proposition
2.
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We start by defining the cut-oﬀ values between the diﬀerent regimes. The
cut-oﬀ values are illustrated in Table 2.
Cut-oﬀ value
Regime Competitive Collusive
2 and 4 U1 + UH2 = bx21 +R U1 + UH2 = ex21 +R
3 and 4 U1 + UH2 = bx31 +R U1 + UH2 = ex31 +R
Table 2: Regime borders
If we look at the equilibrium conditions defined for regime 2 (equations
(3) and (4)) and regime 3 (equations (5) and (6)) we find that bx21 > bx31 andex21 > ex31. A special situation arises when |e1| = |e2|. Then we have that
period 1 production is the same in the competitive and the monopoly case
both in regime 2 and regime 3, bx21 = ex21 and bx31 = ex31. Accordingly, the
cut-oﬀ values defining the borderlines between the regimes are identical and
there is no combination of inflow and reservoir capacity resulting in diﬀerent
equilibria. If |e1| 6= |e2| however,then for some values of inflow and reservoir
capacity the competitive regime is diﬀerent from the monopoly equilibrium
regime and we can state the following proposition. As in Proposition 2, let us
consider the price elasticity in the competitive equilibrium as the benchmark:
Proposition 3 Assume that |et| > 1 and that reservoir capacity and inflow
(R,U1, U
i
2, i = H,L) are such that diﬀerent regimes apply to the competitive
and the monopoly equilibrium. Then,
i) if |e1| < |e2|, period 1 production in the monopoly case is always lower
(and storage higher) than in the competitive equilibrium.
ii) if |e1| > |e2|, period 1 production in the monopoly case is always higher
(and storage lower) than in to the competitive equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix B.
We see that period 1 production in the monopoly equilibrium is always
lower or equal to period 1 equilibrium production in the competitive case if
demand in period 1 is less price elastic than demand in period 2. This result
holds irrespective of whether the competitive and the monopoly equilibrium
belong to the same regime (Proposition 2) or not (Proposition 3). Put dif-
ferently, we find that when |e1| < |e2| in the competitive equilibrium, storage
under perfect competition will never be higher than storage under monopoly.
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This is in line with the results we found in Proposition 2, and it shows that
our basic result is quite robust.
This result however, rests on the assumption that price and marginal
revenue in state H are both non-negative. Suﬃcient inflow in state H may
lead to a situation where the monopolist would want to spill some of the
available water. Also, in the competitive case the price in state H may be
driven to zero if inflow is suﬃciently large. According to Assumption 3,
the monopolist may be forced to produce a quantity that implies a negative
marginal revenue in state H. The only situations where authorities allow
spill of water are when the price in state H is zero or the reservoir is full.
We analyze these situations in the next subsection through an example with
linear demand.
4 An example: Linear demand
Let us now introduce a linear demand function. Such a demand function
implies that the price will become zero for a large enough production quan-
tity. In contrast, with iso-elastic demand the price will never equal zero and
marginal revenue to a monopolist will be positive (when demand is elastic).18
Linear demand and Assumption 3 implies that regime 1 equilibria are possi-
ble and that marginal revenue may be negative in equilibrium. Since the first
order conditions are identical under regimes 1 and 2, we let bx1 and ex1 rep-
resent period 1 production in these regimes under competition respectively
monopoly.
We employ the following inverse demand functions19:
p1 = α1 − β1x1, (9)
p2 = α2 − β2xi2, where i = H,L. (10)
Note that the parameter β captures the market size, while the parameter α
captures the willingness to pay. This is easily seen from the monopoly price
and quantity; p = α/2 and x = α/2β.
18When demand is inelastic there is no monopoly equilibrium. Hence, analysing
monopoly equilibrium with iso-elastic demand by assumption rules out the case we want
to characterise.
19As mentioned above (see footnote 10), demand parameters may diﬀer between periods,
but not over the states of the world. In period 2, when xH2 6= xL2 , it follows that p2(xH2 ) 6=
p2(x
L
2 ).
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4.1 Equilibria in the same regime
Substituting the demand functions defined in (9) and (10) into the equilib-
rium conditions of regimes 1 to 4, we can state the following proposition:
Proposition 4 Assume linear demand as specified in (9) and (10), and that
reservoir capacity and inflow are such that the same regime applies to both
the competitive and the monopoly equilibrium. Then,
i) in regimes 1 and 2, bx1 > ex1 if α1 > (1− q)α2.
ii) in regime 3, bx31 > ex31 if α1 > α2.
ii) in regime 4 bx41 = ex41.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Proposition 4 shows that the parameter α is crucial for understanding
how market power aﬀects allocation of production. At equal prices in the
two periods the absolute value of the price elasticity of demand is lower in
the period with the highest α. A firm with market power would then find it
optimal to reallocate production so that the price is highest in the period with
the highest parameter α. If α1 > α2, reallocation leads to less production
in period 1 in the monopoly equilibrium and higher storage (U1 +UH2 − x1).
This result is in line with what we found in Proposition 2. In both cases
production is increased in the period with the highest absolute value of price
elasticity of demand.
We also note that in regime 1 and regime 2 equilibria the willingness
to pay for electricity in period 1 only have to be higher than the expected
willingness to pay in state L for storage to be higher in the monopoly equi-
librium.
4.2 Equilibria in diﬀerent regimes
The cut-oﬀ values between diﬀerent regimes in the case of linear demand are
reported in Table 3.
As indicated by Table 3 there are regime 1 equilibria in the competitive
case if reservoir capacity and inflow are suﬃciently high; R > α2
β2
and U1 +
UH2 > bx31 + α2β2 . The two remaining cut-oﬀ values in the competitive case are
identical to the values listed in Table 2 above.
In order to make a graphical representation of these regimes, we use a
numerical example where we focus on variations in state H inflow (UH2 ) and
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Cut-oﬀ value
Regime Competitive Monopoly*
1 and 2 R = α2
β2
R = α2
β2
1 and 3 U1 + UH2 = bx31 + α2β2 UH2 = y(U1, UL2 , R = α2β2 )
2 and 4 U1 + UH2 = bx1 +R U1 + UH2 = ex1 +R
3 and 4 U1 + UH2 = bx31 +R U1 + UH2 = ex31 +R
2 and 3 UH2 = y(U1, U
L
2 , R)
Table 3: Cut oﬀ values assuming linear demand. * The cut oﬀ value between
regimes 2 and 3 is defined below in equation (11).
reservoir capacity (R). Assume that q = 0.5, U1 = 0.6, UL2 = 0, β1 = β2 = 1
and α1 = α2 = 1. The border lines between the diﬀerent regimes in the case
of a competitive equilibrium are illustrated in figure 3.
The cut-oﬀ values in the monopoly case listed in Table 3 depend on
whether marginal revenue in stateH is positive or negative. Marginal revenue
in state H is non-negative as long as xH2 ≤ 12
α2
β2
. If R < 1
2
α2
β2
marginal
revenue in state H is never negative because of the reservoir constraint. In
addition, regime 1 is infeasible since regime 1 equilibria require that R > α2
β2
;
p2(
α2
β2
) = 0. Thus, there is no cut-oﬀ value between regime 1 and 2 or 1 and
3 as long as marginal revenue in state H is positive.
Furthermore, when marginal revenue is non-negative in state H it follows
from the equilibrium conditions that ex31 < ex1. For intermediate values of
inflow and reservoir capacity, ex1+R > U1+UH2 > ex31+R, regime 4 equilibria
apply.
Let us turn to the combinations of inflow and reservoir capacity where
marginal revenue in state H is negative. We observe from the equilibrium
conditions that in such cases ex31 > ex1. Instead of a range of inflow/reservoir
values where regime 4 applies, there is now a range of values where it seems
that both regime 2 and regime 3 apply. Recall that the equilibrium solution
should be in regime 3 if U1+UH2 < ex31+R and in regime 2 if U1+UH2 > ex1+R.
Because ex31 > ex1, we know that we are in regime 2 if U1+UH2 > ex31+R and in
regime 3 if U1+UH2 < ex1+R. In situations where ex31+R > U1+UH2 > ex1+R,
the monopoly equilibrium is either in regime 3 or in regime 2 depending on
the level of profit associated with the relevant regime. This is illustrated in
Figure 4, where ∆Π indicate the direction of increased profits.
We calculate profits Π(.) using regime 2 and 3 equilibrium output. Then
17
 Regime 4 
Regime 1 
Regime 3 
Regime 2 1
2
2
1ˆ Ux −+ β
α
 
1
3
12 ˆ URxU
H −+=112 ˆ URxU H −+=
HU 2
2
2
β
α
 
Figure 3: The border lines between the 4 diﬀerent regimes in the competitive
case.
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Unconstrained 
optimum 
R=1, p2(x2H)=0. 
1.44-x1=x2H 
Spill 
∆Π Constrained 
optimum 
x1 
x2H 
Figure 4: The two constrained optimum points illustrate situations where the
monopoly producer is indiﬀerent between a regime 2 and regime 3 equilibrium
output in period 1. In regime 2 the reservoir constraint is satisfied, while the
energy constraint is satisfied in regime 3. The unconstrained optimum is
the monopoly choice of equilibrium production when there is no limit to his
ability to spill water.
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we set the diﬀerence Π(ex1)−Π(ex31) = 0 and solve for inflow in state H.
We find that a monopoly producer would be indiﬀerent between a regime
2 and 3 strategy (when marginal revenue in state H is negative) if
UH2 =
1
2
β2α1 − β1α2 + 2(1− q)(β2)2UL2 − 2β1β2U1
(β1 + β2 − qβ2)β2
+
p
(2β2R− α2)2(β1 + β2)(β1 + β2 − qβ2)
(β1 + β2 − qβ2)β2
(11)
= y(U1, U
L
2 , R).
If UH2 > y(U1, U
L
2 , R), then profit is higher in regime 2. If so, the monopolist
would choose regime 2 equilibrium output in period 1 .
The cut-oﬀ value between regimes 1 and 3 is found by inserting R = α2
β2
into equation (11). The cut-oﬀ value between regimes 1 and 2 is identical to
the competitive case; R = α2
β2
. The border lines between the diﬀerent regimes
under monopoly are illustrated in Figure 5.
Comparing the regime border lines in the competitive case (Figure 3)
with the borders applying to the monopoly case (Figure 5), we observe that
the border lines do not overlap perfectly.20 Thus, as Figure 3 and 5 show,
we have equilibria in diﬀerent regimes for some values of inflow and reservoir
capacity.
Using the border lines defined in Table 3 together with our knowledge of
period 1 production and storage related to the diﬀerent regimes we state the
following proposition:
Proposition 5 Assume linear demand as specified in (9) and (10). Fur-
thermore, assume that reservoir capacity and inflow are such that diﬀerent
regimes apply to the competitive and the collusive equilibria. Then,
i) if α1 > α2, period 1 production in the monopoly equilibrium is always lower
(and storage higher) than in the competitive equilibrium.
ii) if α1 < α2 and α1 > (1− q)α2, period 1 production in the monopoly equi-
librium will be higher or lower than in the competitive equilibrium.
iii) if α1 < (1 − q)α2, period 1 production in the monopoly equilibrium is
always higher (and storage lower) than in the competitive equilibrium.
20In our numerical example, the cut oﬀ value between regimes 3 and 4 however are
identical in the competitive and collusive case.
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 Regime 4 
Regime 1 
Regime 3 
Regime 2 
Border when marginal 
revenue in state H is 
negative. 
112
~ URxU H −+=
HU 2  
R  
1
3
12
~ URxU H −+=  
1
2
2
1 2
1~ Ux −+ β
α
 
2
2
2
1
β
α
 
Figure 5: The border lines between the 4 regimes in the monopoly case.
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Proof. See Appendix B.
Propositions 4 and 5 both show that storage in the monopoly case is
always higher than storage in the competitive case if the willingness to pay
for electricity in period 1 is higher than the willingness to pay for electricity
in period 2; α1 > α2. This result holds irrespective of whether the monopoly
and competitive equilibrium belong to the same regime or not. The intuition
behind this result is simply that under monopoly, the producer want to reduce
sales in the period with the lowest price elasticity. Thus, if we have the
opposite situation where the price elasticity in period 1 is higher than in
period 2 (also when there is overflow in state H) storage in the monopoly
case will always be lower than storage in the competitive case.
From proposition 4 we know that if (1− q)α2 < α1 < α2, there would be
higher storage under regimes 1 and 2 in the monopoly case and lower under
regime 3. Thus, whether there is higher or lower storage in the monopoly
case depends on the combination of inflow and reservoir values. This is also
the case when we focus on combinations of diﬀerent regimes. For some com-
binations of diﬀerent regimes storage will be higher and other combinations
will result in lower storage in the monopoly case.
4.3 Relaxing Assumption 3
Above we have assumed that the authorities will force producers to produce
electricity in state H as long as the price is positive (Assumption 3). Now,
we relax this assumption.
As long as marginal revenue in state H in the monopoly case is positive,
relaxing Assumption 3 adds no new insight to the problem of determining
whether storage is higher or lower in the monopoly case than in the compet-
itive case. This situation is covered in Propositions 4 and 5.
However, if we look at reservoir and inflow values where R > 1
2
α2
β2
and
U1+U
H
2 > ex1+ 12 α2β2 , the situation is diﬀerent. When we relax Assumption 3
and inflow and reservoir capacity are suﬃciently high, the monopolist would
produce a fixed amount equal to 1
2
α2
β2
in state H. At this production level
marginal revenue in state H is zero.
When marginal revenue in state H is zero, allocation of water between
period 1 and period 2 state L is determined by:
p1[1−
1
|e1| ] = (1− q)p2(x
L
1 )[1−
1
|e2| ]. (12)
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Using the linear demand functions from (9) and (10) we get that period 1
production under monopoly is equal and fixed to ex1 when R > 12 α2β2 and
U1 + U
H
2 > ex1 + 12 α2β2 .
Now, we compare the monopoly equilibrium to the competitive equilib-
rium for diﬀerent values of inflow and reservoir capacity. As long the com-
petitive equilibrium is in regime 1 or 2, we have that period 1 production is
equal to bx1. Thus, we find as shown in Prpositions 4 and 5 that storage is
higher in the monopoly case (ex1 < bx1) if α1 > (1− q)α2.
When we look at regimes 3 and 4 competitive equilibria the condition
that α1 > (1− q)α2 is no longer suﬃcient to conclude that storage is higher
in the monopoly case. As long as α1 > (1− q)α2, this implies that ex1 < bx1.
However, because regime 3 and 4 competitive equilibria imply less production
in period 1 than in regimes 1 and 2 we also have that bx31 < bx1 and bx41 < bx1.
Thus, we are unable to conclude that storage is higher in the monopoly case
simply by looking at the condition α1 > (1 − q)α2. If the opposite is true,
α1 < (1 − q)α2, then storage in the competitive case will always be higher
than in the monopoly case.
5 Some concluding remarks
The main question of this paper is whether market power would lead to
higher or lower storage from summer to winter. We compare the monopoly
equilibrium to the competitive equilibrium in a simple two period model with
uncertainty concerning water inflow. We analyze situations where storage
may or may not be constrained by the existing reservoir capacity, and where
inflow is so high that the energy constraint may or may no longer be binding.
We find as a general result that market power, represented by the collusive
equilibrium, would not lead to lower storage if demand is more price elastic
in the winter period. If on the other hand, demand is less price elastic in
winter compared to summer, storage would not be lower in the competitive
case.
Whether demand is more or less price elastic in winter than in summer
is an empirical question. To our knowledge there is no empirical evidence
available at present. Thus, it is not possible to conclude that market power
lead to less storage during summer and thereby increases the probability of
a supply shortage in dry years.
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A Equilibria in the same regime
Here we provide proof of proposition 2 and 4 where we have equilibria in the
same regime.
A.1 Proof of Proposition 2
We have that period 1 production in competitive equilibrium (bx1) under
regime 2 is determined by
p1 = (1− q)p2(xL1 ).
If we divide through by p2 we find that
p1
p2
= 1− q.
Period 1 collusive production (ex1) under regime 2 solves
p1[1−
1
|e1| ] = (1− q)p2(x
L
1 )[1−
1
|e2| ].
We find that p1
p2
= (1− q)
[1− 1|e2| ]
[1− 1|e1| ]
. Period 1 competitive production (bx1) is the
higher if
[1− 1|e2| ]
[1− 1|e1| ]
> 1 or |e1| < |e2| .
Under regime 3, period 1 production in the competitive equilibrium (bx31)
is determined by
p1 = (1− q)p2(xL1 ) + qp2(xH1 ).
In the case of collusion we have that period 1 production under regime 3
(ex31) solves
p1[1−
1
|e1| ] = (1− q)p2(x
L
1 )[1−
1
|e2| ] + qp2(x
H
1 )[1−
1
|e2| ].
We have that the price in competitive regime 3 equilibrium is lower and
period 1 production (bx31) is higher compared to monopoly if
(1− q)p2(xL1 ) + qp2(xH1 ) <
£
(1− q)p2(xL1 ) + qp2(xH1 )
¤ [1− 1|e2| ]
[1− 1|e1| ]
,
or |e1| < |e2|.
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Under regime 4 we have that xH2 = R and that the energy constraint is
binding both under competitive and collusive equilibrium. Thus bx41 = ex41 =
U1 + U
H
2 −R in both cases and they are identical.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 4.
We substitute the inverse linear demand functions defined in equation (9)
and (10) into the equilibrium conditions applying to regimes 1 to 4. Under
regime 1 and 2, period 1 production in competitive equilibrium is equal to
bx1 = α1 − (1− q)α2 + β2(1− q)(U1 + UL2 )
β1 + (1− q)β2
and period 1 collusive production under the same two regimes is given by
ex1 = 1
2
α1 − (1− q)α2 + 2β2(1− q)(U1 + UL2 )
β1 + (1− q)β2
.
Period 1 competitive production (bx1) is higher than the collusive equilibrium
production (ex1) if α1 > (1− q)α2.
Under regime 3, period 1 production in the competitive equilibrium is
determined by
bx31 = α1 − α2 + β2(U1 + qUH2 ) + β2(1− q)UL2β1 + β2
while in the case of collusion we have that period 1 production is equal to
ex31 = 12 α1 − α2 + 2β2(U1 + qUH2 ) + 2β2(1− q)UL2β1 + β2 .
The diﬀerence (bx31 − ex31) is equal to 12 (α1−α2)β1+β2 , where competitive period 1
production (bx31) is higher than collusive period 1 production (ex1) if α1 > α2.
For proof of the regime 4 condition see subsection A.1.
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B Equilibria in diﬀerent regimes
Here we provide proof of Proposition 3 and 5 where we assume that inflow and
reservoir capacity is such that diﬀerent equilibria apply to the competitive
and monopoly equilibrium.
B.1 Proof of Proposition 3.
Because we assume that marginal revenue corresponding to the competitive
equilibrium is positive, we can rule out any regime 1 from the analysis. The
only regimes we have to consider is 2, 3 and 4.
The possible combinations of equilibria in diﬀerent regimes are illustrated
in Table 4.
Competitive regime
2 3 4
Collusive 2 2,3 2,4
regime 3 3,2 3,4
4 4,2 4,3
Table 4: Combinations of equilibria in diﬀerent regimes; possible combina-
tions in bold.
With reference to table 4 consider first a combination of inflow and reser-
voir capacity where we are in regime 3 in the competitive case and either in
regime 2 or 4 in the collusive case. In this situation we can not have less
storage under the collusive outcome compared to the competitive case. Un-
der regime 2 there is overflow if high inflow occurs and some of the available
energy is lost before the second period. In regime 4 the reservoir constraint
is met. In contrast,.under regime 3 in state H there is no overflow and the
reservoir constraint is not met. Regime 3 implies more period 1 production
and less storage than any of the two other regimes.
Second, we consider situations where we have a regime 2 competitive
equilibrium. In addition to a regime 2 equilibrium we could now also have a
regime 3 or 4 equilibrium in the collusive case. If so, period 1 production is
higher in the latter case.
Finally, in a situation where we have a regime 4 solution in the competitive
case, we can either have a regime 2 or a regime 3 solution in the collusive
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case. Period 1 production would be lower in the collusive case if we have a
regime 2 equilibrium and higher if we have a regime 3 equilibrium.
This leaves us with the following combinations of diﬀerent regimes, col-
lusive and competitive respectively, where storage is higher in the collusive
case: {(2, 3), (2, 4), (4, 3)}. On the other hand, storage is higher in the com-
petitive case for the following combinations of regimes: {(3, 2), (4, 2), (3, 4)}.
The combination of regimes resulting in higher storage under competition is
exactly the opposite to the ones defined for the collusive case.
Now, can we observe a situation where we have the regime combination
(4, 3) for some values of inflow and reservoir capacity and the combination
(3, 4) for others? The cut-oﬀ value between regime 4 and 3 in the competitive
case is given byU1+UH2 = bx31+R, while in the collusive case the corresponding
cut-oﬀ value is defined by U1 + UH2 = ex31 +R. If inflow (U1 + UH2 ) is higher
in any of the two cases we have a regime 4 solution. We observe that ifbx31 > ex31, then for some combinations of inflow and reservoir capacity we can
have the regime combination (4, 3). The diﬀerence between bx31 and ex31 is not
aﬀected by inflow or reservoir capacity. We have that bx31 > ex31 if |e1| < |e2|.
Thus, if we observe the regime combination (4, 3) for some values of inflow
and reservoir capacity we can not have the opposite situation (3, 4) for other
values of inflow and reservoir capacity. The same result holds if we compare
the other two remaining combinations of regimes where storage is higher in
collusive equilibrium.
In the competitive case we are in regime 3 if
U1 + U
H
2 −R− bx31 < 0.
In the collusive case, we are in regime 3 if
U1 + U
H
2 −R− ex31 < 0.
When |e1| < |e2| we have that U1 + UH2 − R − bx31 > U1 + UH2 − R − ex31.
This implies that there are more combinations of inflow and reservoir capacity
resulting in regime 3 equilibrium output in the competitive case. For these
combinations of inflow and reservoir capacity we have either a regime 2 or 4
equilibrium in the collusive case.
Also, because |e1| < |e2| we have that
U1 + U
H
2 −R− bx21 > U1 + UH2 −R− ex21.
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This implies that there are less combinations of inflow and reservoir capacity
resulting in regime 2 outcomes in the competitive case. Recall that we we
have a regime 2 equilibrium if U1+UH2 −R− bx21 > 0. If inflow and reservoir
capacity is such that we have a regime 2 equilibrium in the collusive case but
not in the competitive case, then we either have a regime 3 or 4 equilibrium
in the competitive case. Thus, when the equilibrium is in diﬀerent regimes
and |e1| < |e2|, storage is higher in the collusive case.
B.2 Proof of Proposition 5.
With linear demand as defined in equation (9) and (10), then if inflow and
reservoir capacity is suﬃciently large we may have regime 1 equilibria.
The possible combinations of equilibria in diﬀerent regimes are illustrated
in table 5.
Competitive regime
1 2 3 4
1 1,2 1,3 1,4
Monopoly 2 2,1 2,3 2,4
regime 3 3,1 3,2 3,4
4 4,1 4,2 4,3
Table 5: Combinations of equilibria in diﬀerent regimes; possible combina-
tions in bold.
If we have a regime 1 competitive or monopoly equilibrium we know that
R > α2
β2
. This implies that is is not possible to have either a regime 2 or 4
equilibrium as this requires that R < α2
β2
. Thus, as indicated in table 5 the
regime combinations {(1, 2), (1, 4)} and {(2, 1), (4, 1)} are not possible. For
a discussion of the remaining regime combinations we refer to the proof of
Proposition 3 above.
This leaves us with the following combinations of diﬀerent regimes where
storage is higher in the monopoly case: {(1, 3), (2, 3), (2, 4), (4, 3)}. On the
other hand, storage is higher in the competitive case for the following combi-
nations of regimes: {(3, 1), (3, 2), (4, 2), (3, 4)}. As illustrated in subsection
B.1, if we observe the regime combinations {(1, 3), (2, 3), (2, 4), (4, 3)} for
some values of inflow and reservoir capacity, we can not observe the regime
combinations {(3, 1), (3, 2), (4, 2), (3, 4)} for other combinations of inflow
and reservoir capacity values.
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In the competitive case we are in regime 3 if
U1 + U
H
2 −R−
β2(U1 + qU
H
2 ) + β2(1− q)UL2
β1 + β2
<
α1 − α2
β1 + β2
for values of 0 < R < α2
β2
and
U1 + U
H
2 −
α2
β2
− β2(U1 + qU
H
2 ) + β2(1− q)UL2
β1 + β2
<
α1 − α2
β1 + β2
for values of R > α2
β2
.
In the monopoly case, we are in regime 3 if
U1 + U
H
2 −R−
1
2
2β2(U1 + qU
H
2 ) + 2β2(1− q)UL2
β1 + β2
<
1
2
α1 − α2
β1 + β2
for values of 0 < R < 1
2
α2
β2
,
UH2 − y(U1, UL2 , R) < 0
for values of 1
2
α2
β2
< R < α2
β2
and
UH2 − y(U1, UL2 , R =
α2
β2
) < 0
for values of R > α2
β2
.
When α1 > α2 we have that α1−α2β1+β2 >
1
2
α1−α2
β1+β2
. It implies that there
are more combinations of inflow and reservoir capacity resulting in regime 3
equilibrium output in the competitive case for values of 0 < R < 1
2
α2
β2
. For
these combinations of inflow and reservoir capacity we have either a regime
1, 2 or 4 equilibrium in the monopoly case.
Also, because α1 > α2 we have that 12
α1−(1−q)α2
β1+(1−q)β2
< α1−(1−q)α2
β1+(1−q)β2
. This implies
that there are less combinations of inflow and reservoir capacity resulting in
regime 2 outcomes in the competitive case when 0 < R < 1
2
α2
β2
. In the
collusive case we are in regime 2 if
U1 + U
H
2 −R−
1
2
2β2(1− q)(U1 + UL2 )
β1 + (1− q)β2
>
1
2
α1 − (1− q)α2
β1 + (1− q)β2
In the competitive case, we are in regime 2 if
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U1 + U
H
2 −R−
β2(1− q)(U1 + UL2 )
β1 + (1− q)β2
>
α1 − (1− q)α2
β1 + (1− q)β2
.
When 1
2
α2
β2
< R < α2
β2
there is no regime 4 equilibria in the monopoly case
because ex31 > ex1. We know that we are in regime 2 if U1 + UH2 > ex31 + R
and in regime 3 if U1 + UH2 < ex1 + R. In situations where ex31 + R − U1 >
UH2 > ex1 + R − U1, the monopoly equilibrium is either in regime 3 or in
regime 2. The cut-oﬀ value defined in equation (11) imply that ex31+R−U1 >
y(U1, U
L
2 , R) > ex1 + R − U1. If R = 12 α2β2 and U1 + UH2 = ex1 + 12 α2β2 , we have
that ex1 = ex31 and ex31+R−U1 = y(U1, UL2 , R) = ex1+R−U1 as illustrated in
figure 4.
When α1 > α2 we have that bx31+R−U1 > ex31+R−U1 > y(U1, UL2 , R) im-
plying there are more combinations of inflow and reservoir capacity resulting
in regime 3 equilibrium output in the competitive case when 1
2
α2
β2
< R < α2
β2
.
Furthermore, we have that bx1+R−U1 > bx31+R−U1 implying there are less
combinations of inflow and reservoir capacity resulting in regime 2 outcomes
in the competitive case when 1
2
α2
β2
< R < α2
β2
.
The proof related to values of R > α2
β2
is similar. When α1 > α2 we have
that bx31 + α2β2 − U1 > ex31 + α2β2 − U1 > y(U1, UL2 , R = α2β2 ) and bx1 + α2β2 − U1 =bx31 + α2β2 − U1. If R = α2β2 and U1 + UH2 = bx1 + 12 α2β2 , we have that bx1 = bx31 as
illustrated in figure 2.
Thus, when α1 > α2, we can only observe combinations of diﬀerent
regimes where storage is higher in the monopoly case: {(1, 3), (2, 3), (2, 4), (4, 3)}.
The proof related to the situation where α1 < (1− q)α2 is similar to the
one shown for the case where α1 > α2. When α1 < (1− q)α2 we have thatbx1 < ex1 and bx31 < ex31.
For the intermediate situation where α1 > (1−q)α2 and α1 < α2 we have
that bx1 > ex1 and bx31 < ex31. For simplicity, we restrict the discussion to values
of R < 1
2
α2
β2
. Because bx1 +R > ex1 +R we have some combinations of inflow
and reservoir capacity resulting in regime 2 solutions in the monopoly case
and either regime 4 or 3 in the competitive case. In these situations storage
is higher in the monopoly case. However, because bx31 + R < ex31 + R there
are some combinations of inflow and reservoir capacity resulting in regime
3 equilibrium in the monopoly case while we are either in regime 2 or 4 in
the competitive case. Thus, when α1 > (1 − q)α2 and α1 < α2 storage
can both be higher and lower in the monopoly case depending on the actual
combination of inflow and reservoir capacity.
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